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Abstract. Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) in Computer Vision (CV) are
well-known to be vulnerable to Adversarial Examples (AEs), namely im-
perceptible perturbations added maliciously to cause wrong classification
results. Such variability has been a potential risk for systems in real-life
equipped DNNs as core components. Numerous efforts have been put
into research on how to protect DNN models from being tackled by AEs.
However, no previous work can efficiently reduce the effects caused by
novel adversarial attacks and be compatible with real-life constraints at
the same time. In this paper, we focus on developing a lightweight defense
method that can efficiently invalidate full whitebox adversarial attacks
with the compatibility of real-life constraints. From basic affine transfor-
mations, we integrate three transformations with randomized coefficients
that fine-tuned respecting the amount of change to the defended sample.
Comparing to 4 state-of-art defense methods published in top-tier AI
conferences in the past two years, our method demonstrates outstanding
robustness and efficiency. It is worth highlighting that, our model can
withstand advanced adaptive attack, namely BPDA with 50 rounds, and
still helps the target model maintain an accuracy around 80 %, meanwhile
constraining the attack success rate to almost zero.
Keywords: Adversarial Examples · Deep Learning · Security · Affine
Transformation · Data Augmentation.
1 Introduction
With the rapid development of the Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) in Computer
Vision (CV), there are more and more real-world applications that rely on the
DNN models to classify images or to make decisions [11]. However, in recent years,
the DNN models are well known to be vulnerable to Adversarial Examples (AE)
which threats the robustness of the DNN usage [25]. Basically, the AEs can be
1 Han Qiu is the corresponding author.
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generated by adding carefully designed perturbations that are imperceptible to
human eyes but can mislead DNN classifiers with very high accuracy [8].
Today, several rounds of AE attack and corresponding defense techniques have
been developed as shown in [18]. The initial research on adversarial attacks on
DNN models such as Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [8] aims at generating
AEs by directly calculating the model gradients with respect to the input images.
Such methods are then defeated by the defense methods based on various kinds
of methods such as model distillation [16]. Then, the improved AE attacks
are proposed to combine the gradient-based approach with the optimization
algorithm such as the CW [4] aims to find the input features that made the
most significant changes to the final output to mislead the DNN models. Such an
optimized gradient-based approach can defeat many previous defense methods
including the model distillation. Later, advanced defense methods are proposed
to mitigate such attacks by obfuscating the gradients of the inference process.
Specifically, some data augmentation techniques are deployed in such defense
methods such as image compression, image denoising, image transformation [21],
etc. Then, such state-of-the-art methods are then defeated by more advanced
attack methods such as Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation (BPDA) [2]
that can effectively approximate the obfuscated gradients to defeat these defenses.
In this paper, we propose a novel defense method that combines several data
augmentation techniques together to mitigate the adversarial attacks against
on the DNN models. We propose our method, Stochastic Affine Transforma-
tion (SAT), by deploying the image translation, image rotation, and image scaling
method together. Our method can be used as a preprocessing step on the in-
put images which makes our solution agnostic on many DNN models. Firstly,
our method has little influence on the DNN inference which can effectively
maintain the classification accuracy of benign images. Then, intensive experi-
mentation and comparison have been performed to show the improvement of
our method compared with several previous state-of-the-art defense solutions.
Moreover, our method is a lightweight preprocess-only step that can be used on
resource-constrained use cases such as the Internet of Things (IoT) [20].
This paper includes two main contributions. (1) We design a data augmentation-
based defense solution to mitigate the initial and optimized gradient-based ad-
versarial attacks on DNN models. Our method combining several steps of data
augmentation techniques can be used as a preprocessing step on input images
that can effectively maintain the agnostic DNN model’s accuracy. (2) Our method
can also defeat the advanced adversarial attack method such as BPDA which
outperforms many previous state-of-the-art defense solutions.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the background infor-
mation of this research including the brief definition of the adversarial examples
and the previous data augmentation-based defense solutions. Section 3 presents
our threat model and defense requirements. Section 4 proposes our methodology
including the algorithm and the design details. Section 5 illustrates the experimen-
tation details and evaluation results comparing with the previous state-of-the-art
solutions. We then conclude in Section 6.
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2 Research Backgrounds
In this section, we briefly introduce the background of the AEs in DNNs, the
related work on AEs, and the state-of-the-art preprocessing-based defense methods
based on data augmentation techniques.
2.1 Adversarial Examples in Deep Neural Networks
AEs can be explained as imperceptible modified samples that force one or multiple
DNN models outputs with wrong results. This was first highlighted by [25]. By
denoting I an input image, an adversarial example generated from it can be
denoted as I˜ = I + δ, where δ is the adversarial perturbation. The target model,
which conducts inference for classification tasks can be denoted as f , thus the
problem of performing adversarial attacks on the target DNN model can be
formulated as Eq 1.
min‖δ‖, s.t. f(I˜) 6= f(I) (1)
This equation can be interpreted as an optimization task that searches for
a I˜ based on I that can be misclassified by the target model, while keeping I˜
visually as similar to I as possible. The aforementioned AE generation case is
untargeted which aims to mislead the DNN classifier without a pre-set wrong
label. As a targeted AE generation procedure aims to attack the DNN classifier
to misclassify an input I with original label l as the pre-set wrong label l′. In
the concern of real-life adoption of DNN models, both cases can result in serious
outcomes if the models are not protected.
Since the time this vulnerability of DNNs has been discovered, various kinds
of attacks have been proposed in the past few years to help the society to better
understand the nature of AEs. To sum up, past work on adversarial attacks
can be classified into two main approaches including initial gradient-based and
optimized gradient-based. Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [8] is one of the
most famous initial gradient-based adversarial attacks which calculates the model
gradients based on the sign of the gradient of the classification loss concerning
the input image. FGSM performs a one-step gradient update along the direction
of the sign of gradient at each pixel under Linf constraints to generate AEs. Later
on, variations of FGSM were introduced to better searching for the optimum
AE based on a single input. Such kind of methods includes I-FGSM [10] and
MI-FGSM [6], aim at iteratively calculating the perturbations based on FGSM
with a small step or with momentum.
Then, optimized gradient-based AE attacks are proposed to calculate the
gradients based on adopting optimization algorithms to find optimal adversarial
perturbations directly between the input images and output predicted labels [4].
Such kind of attack is especially powerful in a whitebox or graybox scenario by
adopting optimization algorithms to enhance the gradient calculation. Various
optimized gradient-based AE attacks were proposed in recent years including
Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA [15]), DeepFool [14], LBFGS [25],
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Carlini & Wagner (CW [4]), and Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation
(BPDA [2]). We should highlight the BPDA attack here, as it invalidates dozens
of existing state-of-art defense approaches in recent evaluations [2]. The BPDA
attack in a manner assumes that a defense function g(·) maintains the property
g(I) ≈ I in order to preserve the functionality of the target model f(·). Then the
adversary can use g(I) on the forward pass and replace it with I on the backward
pass when calculating the gradients.
2.2 Data Augmentation-based Preprocessing Defense Solutions
Various defensive strategies have been proposed to defeat adversarial attacks.
One direction is to train a more robust model from either scratch or an existing
model. Those approaches aim to rectify AEs’ malicious features by including AEs
into the training set [28], processing all the training data [32], or revising the
DNN topology [16]. However, training a DNN model is very time and resource-
consuming, especially for real-life cases, where models are more complicated.
Besides, in real-life, DNN models are packed as closed-source applications and
cannot be modified, thus those methods are not applicable. Most of all, the
adversary can still adaptively generate AEs for the new models [2].
A more promising direction is to preprocess the input data to eliminate
adversarial influence without touching the DNN model. These solutions are more
suitable in the concern of real-life cases, as it is feasible, efficient, and lightweight.
Thus, The preprocessing based defense is within the scope of this paper, as they
do not require any laborious work with the DNN models, which made them
competitive with most of the real-life defense scenarios. Below we describe some
previous works and their limitations:
Feature Distillation (FD) [12] designed a compression method based on the
JPEG compression but modified the quantization step. The basic idea is to
measure the importance of input features for DNNs by leveraging the statistical
frequency component analysis within the DCT of JPEG. It demonstrated a huge
improvement in defending adversarial attacks compared with the standard JPEG
compression method [19].
SHIELD [5] aims to randomize the quantization step by tuning the window
size and quantization factors in the JPEG compression method. In SHIELD,
the Stochastic Local Quantization (SLQ) method is used to divide an image
into 8 × 8 blocks and applies a randomly selected JPEG compression quality
(tuning quantization factors) to every block. The advantage is that the authors
randomized the selective quantization steps which make the defense process
different for different input images and make the adversarial attacks more difficult.
Bit-depth Reduction (BdR) [31] performs a simple type of quantization that
can remove small (adversarial) variations in pixel values from an image. In the
evaluation of that work, it demonstrates a more effective result comparing to
adversarial training. However, recently developed attacks are not within the scope
of that work, namely the BPDA attack.
Pixel Deflection (PD) [17] aims to add similar natural noises that are not
sensitive to the DNN model. The idea of deflection is to randomly sample a pixel
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from an image and replace it with another randomly selected pixel from within a
small square neighborhood. This could generate an artificial noise that affects
little on the DNN model but can disturb the adversarial perturbations. Then, a
BayesShrink denoising process is followed to recover the image content before this
image is feed into the DNN model. The results of such a method are convincing
since it introduces randomness into the preprocessing step and does not require
any modification on the DNN model. However, the robustness of this method is
significantly reduced if the attackers have knowledge of the preprocess step [2].
3 Threat Model and Defense Requirements
3.1 Threat Model
Untargeted attacks and targeted attacks are two major types of adversarial
attacks. Untargeted attacks try to mislead the DNN models to an arbitrary
label different from the correct one. On the other hand, targeted attacks only
considering succeed when the DNN model predicts the input as one specific label
desired by the adversary [4]. In this paper, we only evaluate the targeted attacks.
The untargeted attacks can be mitigated in the same way.
We consider a full whitebox scenario, where the adversary has full knowledge
of the DNN model and the defense method, including the network architecture,
exact values of parameters, hyper-parameters, and the details of the defense
method. However, we assume the random numbers generated in real-time are
perfect with a large entropy such that the adversary cannot obtain or guess the
correct values. Such a targeted full whitebox scenario represents the strongest
adversaries, as a big number of existing state-of-the-art defenses are invalidated
as shown in [27].
As for the adversary’s capability, we assume the adversary is outside of
the DNN classification system, and he is not able to compromise the inference
computation or the DNN model parameters (e.g., via fault injection to cause bit-
flips [22] or backdoor attacks [7]). What the adversary can do is to manipulate the
input data with imperceptible perturbations. In the context of computer vision
tasks, he can directly modify the input image pixel values within a certain range.
We use l∞ and l2 distortion metrics to measure the scale of added perturbations:
we only allow the generated AEs to have either a maximum l∞ distance of 8/255
or a maximum l2 distance of 0.05 as proposed in [2].
3.2 Defense Requirements
Various life-concerned vital tasks are already implemented with DNN in real-life,
e.g., video surveillance [26], face authentication [13], autonomous driving [29],
network traffic identification [33], etc. Most of those cases’ inference is conducted
either locally in distributed computing units or remotely with the help of cloud
servers. In the case where inference procedures are conducted locally, resources
are highly constrained, thus only lightweight designs of defense can protect the
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system without draw extra burden over those units. Moreover, for both cases,
previous resolutions, e.g. adversarial training or extra modifications over the
target model would be considerably costly for real-life cases (where each sample
is of large size, thus any kind of retraining can be laborious). As mentioned in
the previous section, most of the existing defense methods either too complicated
to be compatible with real-life constraints ([3,9,23]) or not capable of effectively
reduce the impact brought by adversarial attacks ([17]).
To cope with those constraints in real-life adoption of DNNs, we believe the
following properties should be taken considered when designing novel adversarial
defense methods:
• Accuracy-preserving: they should not affect much on the prediction accuracy
of the DNN model on clean data samples that processed by those methods.
• Security: they should be capable to effectively reduce effects brought by
adversarial perturbations.
• Lightweight: the defense method should not be too heavy to impact the
devices’ or units’ performance or operations, considering the limited onboard
computing capabilities and resources.
• Generalization Ability: the defense method should neither require modifications
over the target DNN’s structure nor require any kind of retraining.
Fig. 1. A system overview of adopting SAT in the real-life use case.
Thus, for a better adaptation over nowadays real-life scenarios, we aim to
design a preprocessing-only method to meet all those requirements. It has proved
in our previous work [18], preprocessing-only adversarial defenses are competent
enough to defense adversarial attacks, even for whitebox attacks.
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4 Proposed Methodology
To better adapt to nowadays real-life scenarios’ adoption of DNN, we present
our efficient defense method against adversarial attacks that can conduct pro-
tections on the fly, termed Stochastic Affine Transformation (SAT). Thanks to
the lightweight design of SAT, this defense should be more compatible with both
cloud DNN inference as well as local or edge DNN inference respecting real-life
scenarios. Fig. 1 illustrates an overview of adopting the SAT method in real
life. The details of SAT will be present in Section 4.1. The analysis of the three
hyperparameters respecting the defense efficiency is illustrated in Section 4.2.
4.1 SAT Algorithm
Following the logic of adding randomness to the affine transformation without
harming the classification accuracy [18,9,30], we propose a simple but effective
way of image distortion as an adversarial example defense. The algorithm is
designed based on combining several affine transformation methods. The details
are illustrated in Algorithm 1.
Three basic affine transformations with randomized coefficients are bounded
tother in this single procedure, namely, translation, rotation, and scaling. We
add randomness to those three simple affine transformations so that the attacker
cannot utilize a useful gradient to generate adversarial examples even acknowl-
edges the details of this defense. Such is done by acquiring different coefficients
that follow three uniform distribution for different samples. To be specific, there
are three coefficients along with the raw image as the input of the SAT method.
T is the translation limit, R is the rotation limit, and S is the scaling limit. The
original input will first be randomly shifted away from its original coordinates
according to δx and δy that both follow the uniform distribution in the range
(−T, T ). Then, the data will be randomly rotated at a certain angle δr that
follows the uniform distribution in the range (−R,R). Finally, the distorted
image will be acquired by scaling up or down δs times, where δs follows a uniform
distribution in the range (1− S, 1 + S).
Since only simple affine transformations and random number generator are
adopted in SAT, we believe SAT is compatible with both cloud DNN inference
procedures as well as localized or edge devices DNN inference procedure. This
lightweight design is also hardware friendly and can conduct protections on the
fly.
4.2 SAT Hyper-parameters
As aforementioned, there are three essential coefficients in the SAT method. In
this part, we did a thorough evaluation and analysis of those three coefficients
respecting the efficiency of defending adversarial attacks.
We believe a higher variance between the original data and the protected
data while maintaining a high classification accuracy can help more to defend
adversarial attacks, which is proved in our previous work [18]. In this part, three
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different metrics are adopted to evaluate this variance, namely the l2 norm,
Structural Similarity (SSIM) index, and the Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR).
The classification accuracy (ACC) is the priority of most classification tasks thus
is as well taken considerate in this part.
ALGORITHM 1: Stochastic Affine Transformation
Input: original image I ∈ Rh×w
Output: transformed image I′ ∈ Rh×w
Parameters: translation limit T ; scaling limit S, rotation limit R.
1 I
′
= Oh×w;
/* 1.Translation */
2 δx ∼ U(−T, T );
3 δy ∼ U(−T, T );
4 ∆x = δx × w;
5 ∆y = δy × h;
6 if (x+∆x ∈ (0, w)) ∧ (y +∆y ∈ (0, h)) then
7 I′(x, y) = I(x+∆x, y +∆y);
8 end
/* 2.Rotation */
9 δr ∼ U(−R,R);
10 ∆r = δr × pi/180;
11 for (xi, yj) in {(x, y)|x ∈ (0, w), y ∈ (0, h)} do
12 x
′
i = −(xi − bw/2c)× sin(∆r) + (yj − bh/2c)× cos(∆r);
13 y
′
j = (xi − bw/2c)× cos(∆r) + (yj − bh/2c)× sin(∆r);
14 x
′
i =
⌊
x
′
i + bw/2c
⌋
;
15 y
′
j =
⌊
y
′
j + bh/2c
⌋
;
16 if (x
′
i ∈ (0, w)) ∧ (y
′
j ∈ (0, h)) then
17 I′(xi, yj) = I(x
′
i, y
′
j);
18 end
19 end
/* 3.Scaling */
20 δs ∼ U(1− S, 1 + S);
21 hnew = δs × h;
22 wnew = δs × w;
23 I′ = reshape(I′, (hnew, wnew));
24 if δs > 1 then
25 I′(x, y) = cropping(I′, (h,w));
26 end
27 if δs < 1 then
28 I′(x, y) = padding(I′, (h,w));
29 end
30 return I′;
l2 is a widely adopted metric in deep learning domain to measure the amount
of difference of two samples in the term of Euclidean distance, a higher l2 indicates
a greater difference. Eq. 2 shows how l2 can be computed.
l2(I
′, I) =
√
(I ′R − IR)2 + (I ′G − IG)2 + (I ′B − IB)2/(h× w × 3) (2)
Where I ′ and I are the two 3-channel (RGB) samples to be compared. h and w
are the height and width of those samples respectively.
SSIM is a metric in the computer vision domain normally being adopted to
measure the similarity between two images, where smaller SSIM reflects greater
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 9
difference. To be specific, SSIM is based on three comparison measurements
between two samples, namely luminance (l), contrast (c), and structure (s). Each
comparison function is elaborated in Eq 3, Eq 4, and Eq 5 respectively.
l(I ′, I) =
2µI′µI + c1
µ2I′ + µ
2
I + c1
(3)
c(I ′, I) =
2σI′σI + c2
σ2I′ + σ
2
I + c2
(4)
s(I ′, I) =
σI′I + c2/2
σI′σI + c2/2
(5)
Where µ(·) computes the mean of a sample, σ2(·) computes the variance of a
sample. c1 is equal to (0.01×L)2, c2 is equal to (0.03×L)2. Here L is the dynamic
range of the pixel values. Finally, the SSIM can be acquired by computing the
product of those three functions.
PSNR is most commonly used to measure the quality of reconstruction of
lossy compression codecs, say compression, augmentation, or distortion, etc. A
smaller PSNR indicates a greater difference between the two evaluating samples.
PSNR can be defined via the mean squared error (MSE) between two comparing
samples, which is explained in Eq 6.
PSNR(I ′, I) = 20 · log10(255)− 10 · log10(MSE(I ′, I)) (6)
Where MSE(·) computes the MSE between two inputs.
Table 1. Comparisons of different methods
over ACC and amount of changes.
Defense l2 norm SSIM PSNR ACC
SAT 0.322 0.194 10.219 0.98
FD [12] 0.1343 0.4310 18.050 0.97
SHIELD [5] 0.0405 0.8475 28.345 0.94
BdR [31] 0.0709 0.7730 23.010 0.92
PD [17] 0.0147 0.9877 37.100 0.97
We tried different values of T
and S in the range [0.01, 0.5]. Dif-
ferent values of R is acquired in the
range [0, 40]. Thus, each coefficient
will test 11 values in the respecting
range. As for different metrics, we
will acquire 1331 (11× 11× 11) re-
sults from different combinations
of those different values of coef-
ficients. Fig. 2 demonstrates the
change of those four metrics’ value
when different T , S,and R are
adopted.
In Fig. 2(a), the changes of ACC with those three coefficients varies is
presented. The right side of Fig. 2(a) is the color-bar that reflecting the ACC
attained with respecting combinations of those three coefficients. We can learn
that lower T , S, and R can help the model maintain a high ACC. To ensure a
high ACC, we set 95% ACC as a standard, thus those combinations with ACC
below this standard would not be taken further considerations.
From Fig. 2(b) we can learn that the l2 is not that sensitive with S and R
comparing to T in their respecting range. Combining the information provided
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from Fig. 2(b), Fig. 2(c), and Fig. 2(d) we can as well acquire this similar
analytical result for SSIM and PSNR. This phenomenon also reflects that the
l2, SSIM, and PSNR can all reflecting the scale of changes in a similar manner
respecting affine transformations.
By overlapping Fig. 2(a) with the other three figures, we can acquire a set of
optimum coefficients that ensures high ACC and great variance at the same time.
The set of coefficients for the following experiment is set as follows: T = 0.16,
S = 0.16, and finally R = 4.
We compare the SAT method using those fine-tuned hyperparameters with
other state-of-art adversarial defense methods, which presented in Table 1. As
demonstrated, SAT can create a greater difference between raw samples and
protected samples while maintaining a high ACC than other methods. We will
evaluate whether this greater variance will help and how much will it help DNN
models to defend adversarial attacks in the following section.
(a) ACC as a function over T ,S,R (b) l2 as a function over T ,S,R
(c) SSIM as a function over T ,S,R (d) PSNR as a function over T ,S,R
Fig. 2. Metrics of reconstructed images under different values of T ,S,R
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5 Experimentation and Evaluation
In this section, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the proposed technique.
Various adversarial attacks are taken considered in this part: 4 kinds of stan-
dard adversarial attacks (FGSM, I-FGSM, LBFGS, and C&W) are conducted,
advanced interactive gradient approximation attack, namely BPDA, is also con-
ducted to evaluate the robustness of SAT. We compare SAT with four state-of-art
defense methods publish in top-tier artificial intelligence conferences from the
past two years. This section would be divided into three parts to elaborate on
the settings of the experiment, efficiency over standard adversarial attacks, and
the efficiency over BPDA respectively.
5.1 Experimental Settings
Tensorflow [1] is adopted as the deep learning framework to implement the attacks
and defenses. The learning rate of the C&W and BPDA attack is set to 0.1. All
the experiments were conducted on a server equipped with 8 Intel I7-7700k CPUs
and 4 NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080 Ti GPU.
SAT is of general-purpose and can be applied to various models over various
platforms as a preprocessing step for computer vision tasks as illustrated in Fig. 1.
Without the loss of generality, we choose a pre-trained Inception V3 model [24]
over the ImageNet dataset as the target model. This state-of-the-art model can
reach 78.0% top-1 and 93.9% top-5 accuracy. We randomly select 100 images
from the ImageNet Validation dataset for AE generation. These images can be
predicted correctly by this Inception V3 model.
We consider the targeted attacks where each target label different from the
correct one is randomly generated [2]. For each different attack, we measure the
classification accuracy of the generated AEs (ACC) and the attack success rate
(ASR) of the targeted attack. To be noticed that the untargeted attacks are not
within our scope in this work. A higher ACC or lower ASR indicates the defense
is more resilient against the attacks.
For comparison, we re-implemented 4 existing solutions including FD [12],
SHIELD [5], Bit-depth Reduction [31], and PD [17].
5.2 Evaluation on Defending Adversarial Attacks
We first evaluate the efficiency of our proposed method over standard adversarial
attacks, namely FGSM, I-FGSM, C&W, and LBFGS. For FGSM and I-FGSM,
AEs are generated under l∞ constraint of 0.03. For LBFGS and C&W, the attack
process is iterated under l2 constraint and stops when all targeted AEs are found.
We measure the model accuracy (ACC) and attack success rate (ASR) with the
protection of SAT and other defense methods.
The results are shown in Table 2 and Table 3. For benign samples only, our
proposed techniques have the smallest influence on the model accuracy comparing
to past works. For defeating AEs generated by these standard attacks, the attack
success rate can be kept around 0% and the model accuracy can be drastically
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Table 2. Comparisons of different defense against attacks respecting ACC.
Defense Clean FGSM(=.03) IFGSM(=.03) C&W LBFGS
Baseline 1.00 0.42 0.02 0.06 0.00
SAT 0.98 0.61 0.85 0.78 0.96
FD [12] 0.97 0.47 0.87 0.84 0.97
SHIELD [5] 0.94 0.49 0.84 0.78 0.92
BdR [31] 0.92 0.47 0.82 0.61 0.90
PD [17] 0.97 0.42 0.30 0.11 0.86
recovered, which an efficiency against different kinds of adversarial attacks is
demonstrated. To be noticed, previous work can only attain an accuracy of
around 50% on samples attacked by the FGSM ( = .03). SAT can recover the
accuracy to 0.61%.
Comparing to the Table 1 which compares different methods’ capability of
creating a variance between input and defended sample, the defense efficiency
evaluated in this part shows a strong correlation with the amount of variance
generated by the defense method. This has confirmed the previous conclusion in
our previous work [18].
In a nutshell, the effectiveness of SAT against standard adversarial attack
is demonstrated, as we can attain a state-of-art defense efficiency on all the
evaluated attacks comparing to other methods.
Table 3. Comparisons of different defense against attacks respecting ASR.
Defense IFGSM(=.03) C&W LBFGS
Baseline 0.95 1.00 1.00
SAT 0.01 0.01 0.00
FD [12] 0.00 0.06 0.00
SHIELD [5] 0.01 0.02 0.00
BdR [31] 0.02 0.2 0.00
PD [17] 0.6 0.11 0.02
5.3 Evaluation on Defending Advanced Adversarial Attacks
We then evaluate the effectiveness of SAT against the BPDA attack. Since the
BPDA attack is an interactive attack, we record the ACC and ASR for each
round for different defense methods.
The model prediction accuracy and attack success rate in each round are
shown in Fig. 3(a) and 3(b), respectively. We can observe that after 50 attack
rounds, all other three prior solutions except FD can only keep the model accuracy
2 The ASR evaluation of the FGSM is not shown here since the baseline ASR is 0.
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(a) ACC per round under BPDA attack. (b) ASR per round under BPDA attack.
Fig. 3. ACC and ASR of various techniques under the BPDA attack.
lower than 5%, and attack success rates reach higher than 90%. Those defenses
fail to mitigate the BPDA attack. FD can keep the attack success rate lower
than 20% and the model accuracy is around 40%. This is better but still not
very effective in maintaining the DNN model’s robustness.
In contrast, SAT is particularly effective against the BPDA attack. As our
method can maintain an acceptable model accuracy (around 80% for 50 pertur-
bation rounds), and restrict the attack success rate to 0 for all the record rounds.
This result is as well consistent with the l2, SSIM, and PSNR metrics compared
in Table 1: the randomization effects in SAT cause greater variances between I ′
and I, thus invalidating the BPDA attack basic assumption, which is I ′ ≈ I.
To sum up, the effectiveness of SAT against the BPDA attack is demonstrated,
as a considerable improvement over the defense efficiency against the BPDA
attack is shown comparing to previous work.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a lightweight defense method that can effectively
invalidate adversarial attacks, termed SAT. By adding randomness to the coeffi-
cients, we integrated three basic affine transformations into SAT. Compared with
four state-of-art defense methods published in the past two years, our method
clearly demonstrated a more robust and effective defense result on standard ad-
versarial attacks. Moreover, respecting the advanced BPDA attack, SAT showed
an outstanding capability of maintaining the target model’s ACC and detain
the ASR to 0. This result is almost 50% better than the best result achieved by
previous work against full whitebox targeted attacks.
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